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     Whistleblowing systems serve as a vehicle for 
change, empowerment, and ethical/social 
responsibility. Organizational whistleblowing is a 
socially complex phenomenon that impacts people and 
organizations across various disciplines and sectors. 
Whistleblowing is a high-stakes act involving the 
dissemination of highly sensitive information about 
multiple actors with tangling stakes/interests. These 
features inherently make the task of designing effective 
whistleblowing systems (WS) a challenging one. To 
address this, our paper develops key design objectives 
(DO’s) for effective WS. We do this by conducting a 
qualitative literature review of whistleblowing research 
and by availing elements from design science methods 
and stakeholder theory. We present four key DO’s for 
effective WS, which we support with a whistleblowing 
news dataset.  This paper serves as a first step in 
developing design principles (DP’s) for effective WS. 
This research contributes to a growing discourse on 
organizational whistleblowing in the IS community. 
1. Introduction  
Whistleblowing is a powerful mechanism in 
organizations for fighting corruption and enhancing 
corporate social responsibility and governance [1]. 
Whistleblowing has been thrust to the forefront of 
legislative and corporate discussions in the wake of 
scandals reported by whistleblowers in high-profile 
firms and organizations such as Uber, Google, 
JPMorgan, SNC Lavalin, NSA, and USA Gymnastics 
[2]. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002, 
mandated public companies within the United States 
(U.S.) to implement and maintain an anonymous 
reporting channel for unethical or illegal practices [3]. 
This increasing relevance of whistleblowing motivates 
our study, which seeks the design of effective WS. Jubb 
[4] provides a peer-supported definition of 
whistleblowing as: 
“a non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto 
public record and is made by a person who has or had 
privileged access to data or information of an 
organization, about non-trivial illegality, or other 
wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated 
which implicates and is under the control of that 
organization…”[4:55]. 
Whistleblowing is a high-stakes phenomenon for 
individuals and organizations. As such, whistleblowing 
should take center stage in a society’s fight against 
organizational corruption. Information and 
communication technology has been a dominant 
medium for whistleblowing, though not the only one, 
and has increased the likelihood of whistleblowing [5]. 
Toward designing effective whistleblowing systems, we 
adopt a systematic theory- and data-driven design 
science approach based on a deep understanding of the 
dynamics of whistleblowing and the key constructs and 
relationships that govern the effectiveness of 
whistleblowing [6]. Our study contributes to the extant 
literature by our novel utilization of design science and 
stakeholder theory to develop DO’s for effective 
whistleblowing systems. There has been research on 
whistleblowing systems implementations [7, 8, 9]. 
However, in this paper, we deem it essential that 
consensus be reached regarding WS DO’s by 
researchers and practitioners alike. The resultant 
systems would have common driving DO’s, which does 
not preclude differing DP’s and implementations and 
design features (which are the subject of future 
research).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section two provides an overview of the study’s 
methodology. Section three presents a review of the 
whistleblowing literature. In section four, we propose 
key DO’s for effective WS. Finally, section five 
summarizes our conclusions and plan for future work. 
2. Methodology 
In this research, we follow a three-stage 
methodology as outlined in Figure 1. First, we conduct 
a qualitative literature review aiming to develop a deep 
understanding of the dynamics of whistleblowing and 
the key constructs and relationships that govern the 





effectiveness of whistleblowing. Second, we distill the 
knowledge from the literature review and combine it 
with anecdotes from a whistleblowing dataset in 
proposing key DO’s for effective WS. Third, we use 
design theory methods to develop and empirically 
validate DP’s for effective WS. The scope of this paper 
focuses only on the first two stages of this research, and 
we plan to address the third stage in future research. 
For the first stage, we conduct a literature review in 
the following ordered steps according to best practices 
[10]. Figure 1 shows the primary and secondary 
keywords we use to identify relevant articles on the 
whistleblowing phenomena.  We then identify the 
sources to search for the target article. Due to the 
multidisciplinary nature of the whistleblowing 
phenomena, we target several sources that are known to 
publish academic and practitioner literature in 
management and law as shown in Table 1. To ensure the 
quality of the articles we cover, we consult the 
Australian Business Dean’s Council (ABDC) list, which 
is a globally accepted journal quality ranking list in the 
business and management research community. 
Following the article collection process, we conduct an 
initial round of qualitative examination of the resulting 
articles aiming to categorize them the into key themes 
that best fit the study of the whistleblowing phenomena 
so far. Following that, we conduct iterative qualitative 
examination of the articles for analysis and synthesis.  
For the second stage, we build on the understanding 
accumulated through the literature review in developing 
DO’s for effective WS. To this end, following the design 
science methodology [11], we use observation and 
document studies for gaining a better understanding of 
the practice in which the WS artifact will be used, which 
can provide clues for eliciting DO’s. To accomplish this, 
we avail the Factiva news database to explore actual 
instances of whistleblowing. Factiva boasts over 46,000 
news articles on whistleblowing as of June 2021 [2]. 
Based on qualitative examination of this data by two 
researchers, a consensus is reached on a set of key DO’s 
for effective WS. 
3. Whistleblowing: A literature review 
Examining the whistleblowing literature, we 
identify five main themes that we organize this literature 
review around. Whistleblowing has received 
widespread attention within business ethics, accounting, 
and financial crime literature, mostly pertaining to 
examining the various individual and contextual 
determinants or correlates of whistleblowing. Law and 
governance literatures have also explored 
whistleblowing determinants mainly from 
whistleblowing regulation and legislation perspectives. 
While less represented than other disciplines, more 
recently, IS/IT studies have also contributed to the 
whistleblowing phenomenon by exploring how certain 
technological features impact whistleblowing. 
 
 
Source Collection Methodology Details 
Search 
Keywords 
Primary Keywords: whistleblowing; whistleblower; 
whistleblowers; whistle-blowing; fraud 
reporting. Secondary Keywords (paired with primary or 
*): platform(s); system(s); channel(s)  
Sources General Databases: Business Source Complete, Google 
Scholar, SCOPUS, and Web of Science. Publisher 
Databases: Elsevier, Taylor & Francis, Springer, 
Emerald. Legal Databases: Canadian Legal Information 
Institute (CANLII), U.S. Library of Congress Law. Search 
Space: Title OR Abstract OR Keywords. Source Type: 
Journals OR Conferences OR Books.  
Selection 
Criteria 
Quality: Articles published in ABDC-listed 
journals. Time: Emphasis is given to more recent articles  
 
Figure 1 Outline of the Research and Source 
Collection Methodologies 
3.1 Determinants of whistleblowing 
Research on determinants of whistleblowing can be 
categorized into actor-, organization/context- and 
wrongdoing-related factors as summarized in Table 2. 
Actor-related determinants are characteristics of the key 
actors in a whistleblowing scenario including the 
whistleblower, the alleged wrongdoer, the victim, and 
the report recipient. Organization/context-related 
determinants are characteristics that pertain to the 
organization in power to act on whistleblowing reports 
or the context in which the wrongdoing has taken place. 
Wrongdoing-related determinants are characteristics of 
the wrongdoing itself that potentially predispose the 
whistleblower to report wrongdoings. Table 2 shows 
that actor- and organization/context-related 
determinants are relatively better researched compared 
to wrongdoing-related determinants. One explanation 
could be that whistleblowing is mostly reported 
internally within organizations and obtaining data on 
such high-stakes wrongdoings is difficult. 
Research on determinants of whistleblowing has 
primarily used intent rather than behavior as its 
dependent variable. This could be attributed to the 
difficulty of obtaining data on actual whistleblowing 
behavior [12, 13]. This is demonstrated in Gao and 
Brink [14] whose review of research on whistleblowing 
in accounting adopts whistleblowing intent as its 
dependent variable outcome. Modelling intent and 
behavior as distinct and interacting constructs is 
essential to accurately model human decision-making 
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processes, as indicated most notably by the Theory of 
Planned Behavior and the Theory of Reasoned Action 
[15, 16]. In both theories, intention is modelled as an 
antecedent to behavior. The Theory of Planned 
Behavior suggests that both intentions and perceived 
behavioral control are antecedents of behavior [15]. As 
such, the availability of resources to achieve a behavior 
must also be considered, along with intent. In a 
whistleblowing context, an individual may have 
intentions to report wrongdoing but be unable to achieve 
the behavior for lack of resources [15]. 
3.2 Whistleblowing outcomes: cessation and 
retaliation 
The literature has focused on two possible 
outcomes in response to whistleblowing: cessation of 
the wrongdoing and retaliation against the 
whistleblower. The extent of cessation of the 
wrongdoing determines whistleblowing effectiveness. 
Whistleblowing effectiveness [6] is defined as “the 
extent to which the questionable or wrongful practice is 
terminated at least partly because of the whistleblowing 
and within a reasonable time”. Five sets of actor-related 
(whistleblower, wrongdoer, and complaint recipient) 
and context-related (organization and wrongdoing) 
characteristics have been presented as drivers of 
wrongdoing cessation [17, 18]. 
Retaliation against the whistleblower is another 
possible outcome of whistleblowing. Rehg et al. 
[19:222] define retaliation as “an undesirable action 
taken against a whistleblower in direct response to the 
whistleblowing”. Retaliation can occur either directly 
from the wrongdoer or from others within the 
organization. Rehg et al. [19] indicate that 
whistleblower power, seriousness of the wrongdoing, 
wrongdoer power and lack of organizational support are 
all antecedents of retaliation against whistleblowers. 
Parmerlee et al. [21] show that whistleblower 
characteristics (e.g., age and years of education) can 
impact the likelihood of retaliation.  Fear of retaliation 
from within the organization has been shown to limit the 
effectiveness of robust organizational reporting 
mechanisms [22]. 
3.3 Whistleblowing channels  
Another set of factors that influence whistleblowing 
dynamics are related to the reporting channel [23]. 
Whistleblowing involves the dissemination of highly 
sensitive information and can result in serious career 
and legal consequences for various parties. As such, the 
channel through which information about wrongdoing 
flows plays a key role in effective WS design. Once an 
individual has decided to blow the whistle, they are also 
tasked with deciding to whom they should report and 
using which channel. Employees are commonly faced 
with the decision of whether to report wrongdoings to  
Table 1 Categorization of whistleblowing determinants 
Construct(s) (Relationship Direction)  [Hypothesis 
Results] 
Construct(s) (Relationship Direction) [Hypothesis 
Results] 
Construct(s) (Relationship Direction) 
[Hypothesis Results] 
Actor-related determinants 
Role-prescription (+), moral compulsion (+), job 
performance (-) [24] [P] 
Low whistleblower power in organization (-) [25] 
[C] 
Reduced Expected Cost of Relation (-) [26] 
[C] 
Knowledge on where to report (+), fear of retaliation (-), 
gender (+), and moral perceptions (+) [27] [C] 
Corporate social responsibility (+) and wrongdoer 
rank (-) [28] [C] 
Cultural orientation and attitudes (+/-) [29] 
[C] 
Supervisor support (+), gender (+) and informal policies 
(+) [13] [P] Potential harm (+) and social pressure (+) [30] [C] 
Anonymity (+) and personal cost (-) [22] 
[C] 
Perceived personal cost (-), public service motivation (+) 
and education on whistleblowing (+)  [31] [C] 
Self-esteem (+), locus of control (-) and ethical 
beliefs (+) [32] [C] Cognitions (+) and anger (-) [33] [C] 
Personal risk (-), trust in system quality (+), trust in report 
recipient (+) and system anonymity (+) [34] [C] Prosocial behavioral characteristics (+/-) [35] [D] 
Fear of external threat (+) and perceptions 
supervisor openness (+) [36] [C] 
Perceived behavioral control (+), perceived norms (+), 
whistleblowing attitude (+), gender (-), organizational role 
(+) [37] [C] 
Impulsion (+) and organizational commitment (+) 
[38] [D] 
Job performance (+), satisfaction (+) and 
commitment (+) [39] [R] 
Individual autonomy (+), morale (+), leader credibility (+), 
trust (+) and mobbing (-) [40] [P] 
Mission valance (+), rational work motives (+), 
norm-based and affective work motives (+) [41] 
[P] 
Attitude (+), subjective norms (+) and 
perceived behavioral control (+) [42]P] 
Organization/context-related determinants 
Deterrence sufficiency of whistleblowing system (+) and 
rewards (+) [43] [C] 
Organizational response to wrongdoing (+) [25] 
[C] 
Informal and formal reporting policies (+) 
[13] [Partially Confirmed] 
Respect and openness (+), cooperativeness and flexibility 
(+), fair treatment (+), and trust in supervisory authority 
(+) [41] 
Organizational justice (+) and safety culture (+) 
[40] [P] 
Information Sharing (+), Partisan Political 
Environment (-), Training Effectiveness (+), 
Fairness in Personnel Practices (+), 
Transformational Leadership (+) [44] [C] 
Organizational identification (+) [45] [C] Organizational climate (+) and response to whistleblowing (+) [46] [C] Bureaucracy (+) and regulation (-) [24] [C] 
Organizational support (+), design of protection system 
from retaliation (+), proceduralization (+), and 
organizational diversity (+) [5] [P] 
Procedural (+), distributive (+), and interactional 
justice (+) [47] [C] Supportiveness of climate (+) [32] [C] 
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Organizational size (+), proceduralization (+), and 
whistleblowing training policies (+) [48] [C] Organizational support and protection (+) [31] [C] Differing incentive schemes (+) [49] [C] 
Moral intensity (+) and ethical decision making (+) [50] 
[C] Corporate social responsibility (+) [28] [C] 
Clan (+) and hierarchical (-) organizational 
culture [39] [P] 
Financial rewards (+) [22] [C] Organizational Structure (+/-) [51] [C] Incentives (+) [52] [C] 
Wrongdoing-related determinants 
Seriousness of wrongdoing (+) [24] [C] Type of wrongdoing (+/-) [24] [C] Org dependance on wrongdoing (-) [25] [P] 
*[C]: Relationship Confirmed  [R]: Relationship Rejected [P]: Relationship Partially Confirmed [D]: Proposed 
 
entities outside the organization or to utilize internal 
reporting channels. Park et al. [29:930] define internal 
and external whistleblowing as: “Internal 
whistleblowing is the employee’s reporting of 
wrongdoing to a supervisor or someone else within the 
organization who can correct the wrongdoing (whether 
or not that person has formal responsibility for correcting 
the wrongdoing). External whistleblowing is reporting of 
a wrongdoing to outside agencies believed to have the 
necessary power to correct the wrongdoing.”  
External reporting channels may exist through 
regulatory or governmental bodies, but also include more 
informal channels, such as media outlets [23]. 
Whistleblowers are more likely to utilize external 
reporting channels if their organizations do not have an 
internal formal process or system in place [53]. 
Characteristics of the wrongdoing, such as illegality, can 
also motivate external reporting behavior [6]. Social 
pressures, perceived potential harm, and individual value 
orientation can also impact likelihood of choosing an 
internal or external reporting channel [30]. 
External whistleblowing is less desirable from an 
organizational perspective; therefore, it is important for 
organizations to have available and well-utilized internal 
reporting channels [54]. However, some studies show 
that whistleblowers prefer utilizing internal reporting 
channels over external ones. Though, channel preference 
can differ depending on factors such as cultural attitudes 
toward whistleblowing (which can vary from country to 
country) or whether the organization is public or private 
[29]. 
Just as internal employees may observe and report 
wrongdoings, actors external to the organization may 
also blow the whistle on wrongdoings they observe. 
Audit practitioners provide an excellent example of such 
cases as they often audit other organizations as third 
party. Smaili and Arroyo [23] indicate that 
whistleblowers’ intrinsic motivations change depending 
on whether the whistleblower and the reporting channel 
are internal or external to the focal organization. Latan et 
al. [55] argue that whistleblowing behavior of external 
stakeholders, specifically customers, is often overlooked. 
Such observations can have implications for the design 
of effective WS. As such, different DO’s and features are 
likely necessary in designing WS depending on whether 
system users are internal and/or external to the focal 
organization. 
3.4 Anonymity in whistleblowing 
Whistleblowing channels differ in their support of 
anonymous reporting. One key provision from the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the requirement that public 
companies provide and monitor an anonymous reporting 
channel [56]. Such anonymous reporting “hotlines” 
allow organizations to encourage whistleblowing by 
providing an alternative to a formal reporting process. 
Notwithstanding, organizations do encourage and train 
their employees to first try and report wrongdoing 
through non-anonymous channels before utilizing 
anonymous channels [56]. 
Whistleblowers’ choice of anonymous or non-
anonymous channels for reporting depends on several 
factors. Whistleblowers often prefer using anonymous 
reporting channels especially in the presence of online 
channels [57]. However, their preference may vary 
depending on contextual factors such as industry settings 
and geographic location. In the auditing industry for 
example, auditors often prefer utilizing non-anonymous 
reporting channels [58] despite contrasting research, 
which finds that auditors do prefer anonymous reporting 
channels where available [55]. The preference of non-
/anonymous reporting channels can also differ based on 
organization’s location and industry [29]. 
Another factor that influences the choice of 
anonymous or non-anonymous reporting channels is 
characteristics of the whistleblower including their value 
orientation and personality traits [59]. A third factor that 
affects the use and effectiveness of anonymous reporting 
channels is organizational characteristics including size 
and structure [60]. Such differing findings further 
highlight the potentially complex role of anonymity in 
effective WS design. A fourth factor is the potential 
threat of retaliation against the whistleblower. The 
choice of anonymous reporting channels grows to be 
more likely when the threat of retaliation is present [59]. 
Kaplan et al. [61] indicate that previous incidents of 
retaliation experienced by whistleblowers can reduce 
reporting likelihood through non-anonymous channels. 
Anonymous reporting channels can increase report 
recipients’ trust in report information quality. 
Furthermore, such reporting channels can increase 
whistleblowers’ trust in the report recipient’s authority 
while decreasing perceived personal risk for the 
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whistleblower [34]. Lewis [62] indicates that in some 
cases, anonymity may be discouraged due to the 
perception that anonymous reports are less credible than 
non-anonymous ones. Similarly, Stubben and Welch 
[63] find that managers are less likely to substantiate 
claims in anonymous reports despite those reports 
tending to reveal more information about observed 
wrongdoing. However, to boost whistleblowing reports 
credibility, Young et al. [7] suggest that creating an 
active communication channel with the whistleblower 
can improve the effectiveness of anonymous reporting 
channels without sacrificing anonymity.  
Boasting and guaranteeing anonymity do not always 
go hand in hand. Marcum and Young [8] stress that many 
WS in place “still fail to provide adequate anonymity 
protections for whistleblowers” as system design flaws 
and user negligence can compromise the anonymity of a 
reporting channel. 
3.5 Technology 
Legislations (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the U.S.) 
requiring organizations to implement and monitor 
whistleblowing channels has led to wide adoption of 
IT/IS artifacts to fulfill these requirements [34]. Online 
WS, dubbed virtual whistleblowing, have received 
increasing research attention. Virtual whistleblowing 
takes place in online contexts, is anonymous, and often 
avails specific private networks to transmit information 
external to the organization where the wrongdoing took 
place [65]. Di Salvo [67] highlights two weaknesses of 
virtual whistleblowing. First, whistleblowers may still 
have their anonymity compromised despite best efforts. 
Second, virtual reporting channels available to large 
groups are subject to many false claims of wrongdoing.  
Gao et al. [9] find that employees are more likely to 
report wrongdoings via traditional phone communication 
with live agents than via phone communication utilizing 
a virtual agent (a form of artificial intelligence AI). 
Furthermore, they find that employees are more likely to 
utilize virtual channels that utilize live agents than those 
that do not. These results suggest opportunities for the 
use of AI-powered chatbots in boosting the effectiveness 
of virtual WS. 
Whistleblowing systems typically involve 
anonymous “hotlines” through which employees can 
report observed wrongdoing [9]. Such hotlines can be 
operated by humans, but more recently the use of AI-
powered chat-bots has gained prevalence [9]. 
Whistleblowing systems can also be external services 
offered to an organization, as in the case of EDQ in 
Europe, or internal, as in the case of KPMG who operate 
an internal whistleblowing system [2]. Virtual 
whistleblowing systems, such as “WikiLeaks” tend to 
utilize anonymous “dropboxes” in which whistleblowers 
can provide evidence or communicate without fear of 
retribution or being identified [66]. 
Generally, whistleblowing legislations have not kept 
pace with virtual whistleblowing technologies, wasting 
likely gains in whistleblowing effectiveness [66]. As 
such, virtual whistleblowers may be discouraged to 
report wrongdoing due to fear of retaliation. Such 
observations highlight that while IS artifacts can and do 
enable whistleblowing, contextual factors such as 
legislations and culture can be impediments – 
considerations that need to be taken in the design of 
effective WS. 
4. Design objectives for effective 
whistleblowing systems 
Design objectives (DO’s) are the goals that a design 
should be able to achieve. The “Design for X” literature 
emphasizes the need to consider all design 
goals/objectives in the early stages of design, which is 
conducive to producing better artifacts. In 
industrial/manufacturing settings, “X” may refer to goals 
such as manufacturability, assembly, and quality to 
mention a few. Furthermore, the design science research 
methodology [64] has “defining requirements”, which 
includes developing DO’s as a key stage following the 
“problem definition” stage.  Design science research 
pertains to the creation and evaluation of “IT artifacts 
intended to solve identified organizational problems” 
[64:77]. As such, our artifact of interest is an 
organizational whistleblowing system, as a general 
construct.  
Peffers et al. [68] indicate that DO’s should be 
inferred from the problem definition stage of the research 
process. Furthermore, Hevner et al. [64] assert that in a 
design science methodology, the theoretical foundations 
and existing knowledge base of a subject should be 
effectively utilized in developing a design artifact. As the 
literature review reveals, whistleblowing involves 
multiple stakeholders and is experienced at multiple 
levels of analysis where WS effectiveness has 
implications at the individual, group, organizational, 
system and societal levels. Accordingly, our underlying 
methodology in proposing DO’s for effective WS is 
based on our stakeholder analysis combined with our 
synthesis and observations from the literature review 
along with the anecdotes in Factiva news dataset. 
Following design science guidelines [68], we 
distinguish between DO’s and DP’s. While DO’s are the 
general goals of the design regardless of how these goals 
are implemented, DP’s involve implementation aspects 
such as the functionality or features that can achieve the 
DO’s. While we expect divergence on DP’s across 
different WS implementations for pragmatic reasons, we 
expect consensus on DO’s regardless of the entity(ies) 
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that would operate a WS (e.g., corporations, independent 
regulatory bodies, not-for profit, and/or government 
organizations). We hope that this paper stimulates a 
discussion about consensus on DO’s. 
We observe from our review of the literature and 
qualitative examination of the Factiva dataset that 
whistleblowing thrives on the activities of the 
stakeholders involved. Stakeholder theory defines a 
stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives” [68:22]. Stakeholder theory has been widely 
used in IS research to understand the factors that lead to 
meeting their performance goals [69]. Several studies 
propose different methods in applying the stakeholder 
perspective in designing information and organizational 
systems [70, 71]. Common among these methods are 
first, identifying the stakeholders and second, identifying 
their stakes/interests, which should then be considered in 
systems design. Following these methods, Table 2 
identifies the stakeholders in a whistleblowing scenario. 
We allow the victims of wrongdoings to be examined 
separately from whistleblowers. However, we treat the 
two as one entity who is in power to act on 
whistleblowing reports. Furthermore, based on our 
review of the literature, we identify the stakes for 
different stakeholders as shown in Table 2. 
4.1 Protecting the whistleblower 
“Whistleblowers are the single most important 
corporate resource for preventing fraud” [72]. The first 
and highest prioritized objective in designing effective 
WS is to protect the whistleblower from retaliation. The 
potential threat of retaliation can increase 
whistleblowers’ perceived personal costs associated with 
reporting wrongdoing, and can lower reporting intention 
[5, 22, 29, 40].  The whistleblower bears the highest risk. 
Letting that risk cloud the whistleblower’s decision-
making process would weaken their intent and behavior 
to blow the whistle on organizational wrongdoings. 
Legislative testimonials and law journal publications 
have also emphasized the importance of protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation [73].  
The Factiva dataset reveals several recent cases of 
retaliation against employees who raised concerns 
related to their employers’ handling of COVID-19 
related processes. Furthermore, we find instances of 
retaliation against the whistleblower in large multi-
national corporations such as Alphabet, JPMorgan Chase 
& Co, Halliburton, Snapchat, AECOM Technology, and 
The Carlyle Group. The Factiva dataset also reveals calls 
for increased whistleblower protection in large U.S. 
government institutions such as the SEC, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and, most notably, the National 
Security Administration (NSA) in the Edward Snowden 
Case. 
Table 2 Stakes for stakeholders of 
organizational whistleblowing systems [74] 




Whistleblowers Reward, Retaliation  Personality, Demographic  
Victims Reward, Retaliation Power, Credibility 









Beyond retaliation, which is inflicted by the 
wrongdoer and/or authorities in the organization, 
whistleblowers can also suffer stigmatic repercussions 
[75], which are inflicted by the organization’s broader 
community. Such stigmatization can be extremely 
harmful and can lead to devastating social, economic, 
and mental health outcomes for whistleblowers [76]. One 
news article argues that many in Australia view 
whistleblowing as “un-Australian”, which results in 
instances of bullying and stigmatization by coworkers. 
Anonymity of the whistleblower has been the 
dominant mechanism of protection in the current 
literature [56, 60, 77]. We regard anonymity as one, but 
not the only, DP for protecting whistleblowers. In many 
instances, whistleblowers choose to reveal their identity 
for various reasons, including infusing credibility in their 
reports. For example, the much-publicized case of 
Edward Snowden who went beyond simply revealing his 
identity to participating in the development of a 
documentary. Accordingly, we propose that, 
DO1: WS will have the objective of protecting the 
whistleblower from potential retaliation and/or 
stigmatization resulting from reporting wrongdoings. 
4.2 Protecting the victims of wrongdoing 
While the whistleblower may be the victim (or one 
of the victims) of wrongdoing, this is not always the case. 
In the audit industry for example, the whistleblower may 
be an auditor external to an organization and is not a 
victim of fraud [13]. Individuals may be less pressured to 
blow the whistle the further their proximity is from the 
victim(s) [30]. For instance, the Factiva dataset shows a 
report where an Italian researcher was pressured into 
falsifying data in a WHO report that examined Italy’s 
COVID-19 pandemic preparedness. Public servants who 
blow the whistle on wrongdoings in their organizations 
are driven by their motivation to protect and inform the 
public, who in this case could be classified as the victims 
[2]. One article by Sarah Champion, a U.K. MP, 
indicated that victims of abuse may become more 
vulnerable to escalation of the wrongdoing after the 
whistle has been blown. This 2017 article was a call for 
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change within the Parliamentary system regarding abuse 
scandals. This case provides tangible evidence that the 
victims of wrongdoing could see their situation worsen 
if the whistle was blown on their behalf, or own accord. 
As such, WS should make provisions to protect not only 
whistleblowers but also victims of wrongdoings from 
retaliation. Accordingly, we propose that, 
DO2: WS will have the objective of identifying and 
protecting the victims of wrongdoing from potential 
retaliation resulting from reported wrongdoings. 
4.3 Protecting the falsely accused 
Not all whistleblowing reports are valid – some are 
false, unfounded, and/or inaccurate in representing the 
facts or accusing the right entity. This is especially the 
case in virtual whistleblowing systems that receive a 
large number of reports [35] and where reporting can be 
easy, costless, and anonymous. Vandekerckhove [78] 
asserts that for whistleblowing to be effective, false 
reports must be identified and excluded. At one extreme, 
false accusation can be made intentionally, which in and 
of itself is seen as a form of wrongdoing [28] that WS 
should seek to identify. Bouter and Hendrix [79] argue 
that like whistleblowers, the falsely accused are a 
vulnerable group in need of protection.  
The Factiva dataset reveals several cases of 
whistleblowing involving false accusations. In one case, 
a University of Toronto employee falsely accused a 
coworker of threatening them at knifepoint and was 
eventually terminated because of their false accusation. 
Several other cases in the dataset point to negative career 
consequences for executives and high-level managers 
who are victims of false whistleblowing, and negative 
financial performance and credibility consequences for 
the focal organizations. As a side effect, the Factiva 
dataset also indicates that protecting wrongdoers from 
false whistleblowing can discourage whistleblowing in 
general. However, protecting the falsely accused by 
identifying false whistleblowing remains necessary to 
infuse stakeholders’ trust in whistleblowing reports. As 
such, any protections for falsely accused wrongdoers 
must not dissuade possible whistleblowers. Protecting 
the falsely accused by identifying and excluding false 
whistleblowing is necessary as a self-cleaning 
mechanism to maintain credible regard for 
whistleblowing reports. Accordingly, we propose that, 
DO3: WS will have the objective of identifying 
false accusations to protect the alleged wrongdoer from 
potential consequences of false accusations. 
4.4 Pressuring the organization to act    
 Whistleblowing is often implemented as a vehicle 
for organizational change and therefore necessitates an 
organizational response to act to resolve reported 
wrongdoings [80]. Verschuuren [81] indicates that the 
expected organizational response to reported 
wrongdoing plays a key role in the implementation of 
effective reporting mechanisms. Termination of the 
wrongdoing is one possible organizational response to 
wrongdoing, but it is not the only one [6]. Mesmer-
Magnus [12] indicates that once the whistle has been 
blown, the organization is faced with two key decisions: 
whether to act on or disregard the report.  There are many 
whistleblowing cases in the Factiva dataset that show 
that the respective organizations took action to address 
the wrongdoings. However, there are also many cases of 
organizations’ inaction toward reported wrongdoings.  
One case of inaction has recently surfaced when two 
former Michigan football players went public pledging 
they could have been spared from sexual assaults if their 
coach, Bo Schembechler, had addressed complaints 
about former team doctor Robert Anderson made by 
Schembechler's son, Matt who was also molested by the 
same doctor at the age of 10. The coach ignored his own 
son’s whistleblowing, letting the predator later prey on 
the two players among 800 others who also filed similar 
legal claims of sexual abuse.  
Some organizations may act albeit late, which also 
causes more victims to fall prey to the wrongdoer. In the 
wake of the U.S.A Women’s Gymnastics team scandal 
where their osteopathic physician – a Michigan State 
University medical faculty member – sexually abused 
team players who were mostly minors. The university’s 
Acting President formally apologized to the survivors 
where he acknowledged the university was too slow to 
grasp the enormity of the offenses and failed to treat them 
with the care and respect they deserved [82]. While cases 
of the physician’s abuse reportedly started during the 
1990s, U.S.A Gymnastics denied knowledge of any 
wrongdoing until 2015. Belkin and Radnofsky [83] 
report that Michigan State University was aware of and 
had the chance to stop the wrongdoing but did not do so. 
When one such case of abuse is too many, delay in acting 
to stop the wrongdoing brought the tally of victims to 
332. Michigan State later settled with the victims for over 
$500 million USD. 
Also, when organizational action is 
disproportionally weak compared to the magnitude of the 
wrongdoing, more victims could fall prey. In one case 
reported in the Factiva dataset, whistleblowers at 23 care 
homes across Britain have claimed that tests showing 
residents had Covid-19 were deliberately not disclosed 
to staff or families by care home authorities. Staff 
members were told to play the test results down as 
disclosing them would “reflect badly” on the homes. As 
a result of this organizational cover-up, care workers and 
residents were subjected to infection threats of COVID-
19 and some likely unnecessarily contracted it. 
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Moore and McAuliffe [17] find that most 
whistleblowers are dissatisfied with organizational 
action (or lack thereof) to reported wrongdoings. Aside 
from dysfunction, organizational inaction or late and/or 
disproportionately weak response to whistleblowing 
reports can be motivated by their interest in maintaining 
the status quo and/or protecting those in power. Given 
the above, pressure should be kept on organizations 
where wrongdoings are reported to act swiftly and to do 
so in a manner proportionate to the wrongdoing. 
Accordingly, we propose that, 
DO4: WS will have the objective of pressuring 
organizations in power to act swiftly and proportionately 
to address whistleblowing reports. 
We speculate that the proposed DO’s would be 
applicable across organizations and countries. Protecting 
the stakeholders of whistleblowing (the first three DO’s) 
and pressuring the focal organizations to act on reports 
of whistleblowing are likely to be essential for effective 
whistleblowing regardless of context. Ultimately 
however, confirming these speculations would require 
empirical research.  
5. Conclusions and future work 
At the intersection of corruption, power, public good, 
and individuals’ well-being lies organizational 
whistleblowing, the most important mechanism in 
preventing systematic corruption.  Despite growing 
whistleblowing research, regulation, and technology, the 
fight against organizational corruption appears far from 
over yet. This research embarks on designing effective 
WS using systematic theory- and data-driven design 
science methodology. Toward this goal, we find a myriad 
of stakeholders with a mesh of tangling interests that we 
build upon in proposing key DO’s for effective WS 
aiming to protect the stakes and uphold the interests of 
stakeholders. 
Our findings and proposed DO’s are a foundation to 
mount an agenda for future research. First, following best 
practices [70], we will empirically examine the validity 
of the proposed DO’s using focus groups involving 
sample stakeholders from actual organizational 
whistleblowing cases that already took place in North 
American context. Second, to operationalize the 
proposed DO’s, we will develop a set of DP’s to be 
implemented in a real-life whistleblowing system to 
allow for field experimental data collection and system 
effectiveness performance evaluation. 
In the wake of whistleblowing reports on momentous 
wrongdoings involving vulnerable groups, we hope that 
our research is a step toward safer and more effective 
whistleblowing for all stakeholders involved and toward 
an organizational corruption-free society. 
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